Three stores, three blockers, one way of working.

3× more buyers from the same traffic: how we grew Oh!Good Romania

Case study: growth marketing, brand localisation & conversion optimisation

The business context

Some brands enter a new market with the product ready, the website working and the feeling that things should move fairly quickly.

Except a new market doesn't buy automatically just because the product exists.

Oh!Good is a plant-based nutrition brand, with protein powders and complete meals. The brand was already active in several countries and had its infrastructure in place: products, an online store and a clear business direction.

Romania, however, came with its own questions.

People want to know whether the product tastes good, whether it keeps them full, whether it's worth the money, whether it fits their life, and whether it isn't just “another vegan product” that promises more than it delivers.

When we started working together, Oh!Good was present in Romania but didn't yet speak naturally enough to the local audience. It lacked the clarity and local trust that turn interest into an order.

Where growth was stuck

The problem was what happened after people reached the site.

In January 2025, out of every 100 people who visited the site, roughly 1 bought. And in an online store, the difference between 1 buyer and 3 buyers from the same traffic can completely change how efficient your campaigns are.

It showed in a few simple places:

• —The copy was correct, but didn't sound natural enough for the Romanian market.
• —Product pages explained, but didn't answer the questions that come up before buying well enough.
• —The ads got attention, but didn't build enough trust yet.
• —Local content needed real people, credible voices and examples that made the product feel familiar.

Between the product and the purchase, an important layer was missing: trust.

And without that layer, a bigger ad budget would have brought more people into a system that wasn't yet ready to convince them.

The strategic direction

The direction was to build trust first.

It wasn't enough to translate Oh!Good into Romanian and launch campaigns. We had to make it feel natural, credible and relevant to people here.

We wanted the brand to have messaging that sounds natural, pages that answer the buyer's real questions, and local proof that makes the product easier to try.

That also changed how we looked at the category.

We didn't need to convince people to go vegan. We needed to show why the product makes sense on an ordinary day: when you want something quick, tasty, nutritious, easy to prepare and more balanced than what you'd grab on the go.

What we changed

We started with the things that shape the decision before someone taps “buy”.

We rewrote the key messages so the product was explained more clearly and more naturally for the Romanian market.

We worked on the product pages so people understood faster what they were buying, why they'd need it and what made it relevant to them.

We changed how the product was presented visually, so it didn't feel cold or generic, but closer to the buyer's real life.

We built ads from scratch for the Romanian audience — not adaptations of material designed for other markets.

We brought local creators and Romanian testimonials into the communication, because in a new market trust isn't built from the brand's claims alone. It's also built through real people who can say: “yes, I tried it, it makes sense, it's good.”

Then we tested constantly: messages, visuals, audiences, angles and content formats.

We didn't treat marketing as a campaign you set up and let run. We treated it as a system that has to be watched, understood and adjusted.

The results and what they mean

The first changes showed quickly.

In January 2025, out of every 100 people who visited the site, roughly 1 bought. The following month, after we'd worked on the message, the pages, the ads and local trust, that number passed 3 buyers out of 100.

More precisely, the conversion rate rose from 1.32% to 3.72% in month two. The best month reached 4.16%.

For an online store, that matters enormously. From the same traffic, more people end up buying. The ads work harder. The budget is used more efficiently. Growth no longer depends only on constantly bringing new people to the site.

Over the year, the results started to settle in.

• —In Q2, the site stayed stable at roughly 2.7–3.1 buyers per 100 visitors.
• —In Q3, revenue grew 45.3% over Q2, and campaigns hit their best quarterly ROAS: 3.63x.
• —In September, stock-outs blocked campaigns for almost the entire month.
• —In October, once stock was back, the conversion rate climbed again to 3.97%.
• —In Q4, revenue was 44.3% higher than in Q1.
• —And in January 2026, revenue was almost 10 times higher than in January 2025, with +186% sessions and +558% completed orders.

This is where you see most clearly what a growth strategy means.

You look at where the path from interest to purchase breaks, fix that point, test, adjust and scale what starts to work.

For Oh!Good, growth didn't come from ads alone. It came from the messaging, the pages, the local content and the campaigns starting to work together.

That's how the same traffic started bringing in more buyers.

What the client says

What you can take from this project

A good product doesn't sell itself.

People need to understand quickly what they're buying, why it fits them and why they can trust it enough to try it.

In Oh!Good's case, growth started with a closer look at the buyer's path: what they see, what they understand, where they hesitate and what convinces them.

That's what a good growth strategy does. It doesn't come with a preset recipe. It looks at the business, the data and how people behave, then acts where change can produce the biggest impact.

For Oh!Good, the critical point was trust. For another business it might be the offer, the website, the message, the price, the ads, the stock or the lack of a clear direction.

The question stays the same:

where does the buyer get lost before buying?

That's where real growth begins.

60% less ad spend and more efficient results: how we grew Miss Sophie's profitability

Case study: media buying, budget efficiency & profitability strategy

The business context

Some brands reach a point where growth at any cost is no longer the best strategy.

Early on, it matters to win market share, move fast, test (aggressively) and grow visibly. But there comes a moment when the business needs something else: efficiency, profitability and better control over budgets.

Miss Sophie is a German beauty brand in nail care, with a strong presence in the DACH region. In its years of rapid growth, the brand had reached annual revenue in the millions of euros and built a solid base of repeat customers.

After that growth period, the market started to cool. Platform costs went up, especially in Q4, and beauty e-commerce no longer had the momentum of its peak years.

Where growth was stuck

Miss Sophie had the brand, the product, the customers and a history of growth. The blockage came from how budgets had to be managed in a more expensive market.

Ad costs kept climbing. Q4 grew more competitive every year. Black Friday pulled big budgets into the platforms, and every euro spent at the peak bought less attention than in the rest of the year.

In the growth years, almost half of revenue ended up reinvested in paid ads. For an expansion phase, that could make sense. For a profitability phase, it was becoming too much.

The challenge was simple to state and hard to execute:

how do you cut the budget without cutting performance?

Cutting spend is easy. Cutting spend while raising efficiency, lowering acquisition cost and protecting Q4 is much harder.

The strategic direction

The direction was to move from “more budget for more growth” to “more efficiency from every euro invested”.

We treated media buying as part of the business plan, not as a separate channel that just consumes budget.

That meant looking more closely at the ratio between money invested in ads and revenue generated, at acquisition cost, at campaign efficiency, at the rhythm of the market and at the periods when it is — or isn't — worth pushing the budget.

One of the most important decisions concerned Q4.

In many businesses, the reflex is to throw more money at Black Friday because “that's when it sells”. But that's exactly when competition is highest and platform costs rise considerably.

So our direction was different: build demand earlier, warm up audiences before the expensive peak, and avoid reactive decisions on the days when everyone is bidding aggressively.

In short: we didn't want to pay the Q4 “panic tax”.

What we changed

In the growth years, the ad budget was used aggressively to push revenue. In the new phase the goal was different: every channel, campaign and budget decision had to answer one simple question:

how efficiently does it turn money invested into real revenue?

The first important step was to reset the ratio between ad spend and revenue. The target moved to a healthier zone, where the business could keep more of what it produced.

We used Q3 and October to warm up audiences, prepared the promotional communication before Black Friday and avoided decisions made under pressure.

We kept discipline across channels.

Meta and Google stayed the main engines, because that's where the economics worked best. TikTok and Pinterest were tested in a controlled way, with separate budgets and clear limits. When the numbers supported the channel, we kept going. When they didn't support scaling, we stopped it before it diluted overall performance.

We shifted more attention to creative.

When you cut budgets, you can't afford to burn money on tired ads. You need fresh, relevant material that's tested constantly. That's why we leaned more on UGC and in-house content rather than expensive influencers who consume budget without always supporting efficiency.

And, very importantly, we tied media buying to business planning.

We worked with quarterly strategic reviews and monthly check-ins connected to the reality of the business: revenue, margin, costs, Q4, profitability.

The results and what they mean

The most important result: Miss Sophie ended up spending far less and getting more efficient results.

Ad spend fell by about 60%, while ROAS rose 35%. At the same time, the average cost per acquisition dropped 28%, and ad spend as a share of revenue fell by 12.2 percentage points.

In short: the brand invested less money in ads, but every euro worked harder.

The numbers show the shift clearly:

• —ROAS rose from 2.10x to 2.83x.
• —Ad spend as a share of revenue fell from 47.5% to 35.3%.
• —Average cost per acquisition dropped from €17.39 to €12.54.
• —Cost per new customer dropped from €25.71 to €20.40.

That matters enormously for a mature brand.

In a rapid-growth phase you can accept a higher cost if you're buying market share. In a profitability phase, the same logic starts to weigh on the business. You need to keep more of what you produce.

Miss Sophie generated roughly the same Q4 revenue as in an earlier reference period, but with about 30% less spend and a Q4 ROAS 44% higher.

That's the difference between throwing a big budget at Black Friday and building Q4 with a plan.

We won Q4 through planning, warmed-up audiences, channel discipline and better creative.

What the client says

What you can take from this project

Healthy growth doesn't always mean bigger budgets.

The business needs more discipline and strategy, not more pressure on ads.

In Miss Sophie's case, the challenge was to make better use of every euro invested, in a period when costs were rising, the market was cooling and Q4 was getting more expensive.

This is where a mature strategy shows its value.

You look at sales, but you also look at what those sales cost you. You look at what stays in the business, when it's worth accelerating, when it's worth stopping and which channels truly support profitability.

From €4,452 to €37,205 a week: how we scaled Doughnut Time in Germany and the UK

Case study: e-commerce growth, paid media & conversion strategy

The business context

Some products almost sell themselves when you see them in front of you.

You see them, you crave them, you want them.

Online, though, craving needs something more.

Doughnut Time is a premium doughnut brand present in Germany and the UK. The product was visual, mouth-watering and well suited to gifts, special occasions or small moments of indulgence.

In the shop, the product could convince through smell, texture and the display case.

Online, it had to convince through images, messaging, video, the offer and the promise that it would arrive at the customer's door in good shape.

Where growth was stuck

Sales were modest and concentrated in a single market. The brand needed to reach new customers, explain delivery better and grow without losing ad efficiency.

People could crave the product. They could visit the site. They could understand the offer. But the moment doubt about shipping appeared, the decision stalled.

It showed in a few simple places:

• —the delivery message had to be made more visible;
• —the product's packaging had to be shown;
• —campaigns had to be built around the moments when people naturally buy gifts and special products;
• —targeting had to move towards areas where the product carried more value;
• —price and shipping fee had to be set so they didn't block the decision in the cart.

The problem was that people needed more reasons to believe the experience the brand promised would reach them intact.

The strategic direction

The direction was to make delivery part of the promise.

In e-commerce, a perishable product needs more than appetising photos. It needs to reduce the fear in the buyer's mind: “will it arrive in good shape?”, “is it worth the shipping?”, “will it look the same when I get it?”, “is it right as a surprise or a gift?”

So we built the communication around one idea:

premium doughnuts, delivered to your door, packed with care.

That changed how we thought about the campaigns.

We used craving as the entry point, but built trust as the reason to buy.

We then saw that the best orders didn't necessarily come from the big cities. In Germany, villages and small towns performed very well, because people had fewer local alternatives for premium desserts. There, the product was more special, harder to find and easier to justify as a treat or a gift.

We then built campaigns around moments with high purchase intent: Valentine's Day, Easter, Mother's Day, Christmas, flavour launches and periods when people look for surprises or gifts.

What we changed

The first important thing was to show the packaging.

We used videos that showed the packing process from the very first seconds. People could see concretely that the product was protected, prepared for transport and designed to arrive in good shape.

Then we adjusted targeting.

Instead of treating every area the same, we followed where orders came in best.

We built the campaign calendar around seasonality.

We also worked on the commercial offer.

One of the most valuable discoveries was that a higher product price combined with a lower shipping fee performed better than a cheaper product with expensive shipping.

A high shipping fee created friction in the cart. We adjusted the offer logic so the step towards ordering felt easier.

We also added mechanisms that reduced perceived risk.

The money-back guarantee lifted the conversion rate by more than 50%. It was a simple change, but a very powerful one, because it took some of the pressure of the decision off the customer.

Once the brand passed 4,000 unique customers, we introduced CRM and email marketing. That helped the business get more value from its existing customer base rather than depending only on new traffic.

And when we entered the UK, we didn't start from zero.

We carried over what had already worked in Germany: the packing videos, the delivery message, the seasonality, the targeting and the offer logic.

The results and what they mean

• —Doughnut Time grew from €4,452 to €37,205 in weekly revenue.
• —In total, the campaigns generated over €534K in tracked revenue and 9,603 orders in Germany and the UK.
• —The blended average ROAS was 4.46x.
• —Growth was built from several pieces that started working together.
• —The videos reduced distrust around delivery.
• —Targeting moved the budget towards areas with more potential.
• —Seasonality turned special occasions into sales peaks.
• —The offer reduced friction in the cart.
• —CRM and email marketing raised the value of existing customers.
• —In Germany, small towns and less urban areas became an important discovery. In the UK, the launch went faster precisely because we used what we had already learned.

That's the difference between a campaign and a growth system.

A campaign can bring sales in the short term. A system shows you what works, where it works, when it works and how you can repeat it in a new market.

What the client says

What you can take from this project

A product people want also has to be easy to buy.

Doughnut Time had a visual, craveable product well suited to gifting. But online, craving had to be backed by trust, clarity and a well-set offer.

You look at what blocks the purchase, not just at what grabs attention. In Doughnut Time's case, the blocker was trust in delivery. For another business it might be the price, the packaging, the product description, the lack of reviews, the shipping cost or the wrong moment to promote.

Once you understand the blocker, you can build campaigns that sell better.